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s 6678 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 11, 1971 
have an all-volunteer army. We have 
tried to discriminate against our own 
citizens and their wives in a manner 
that I cou.ld not imagine any country in 
the world doing. 
We have never gi ;n this a fair try. 
Mr. President, I will have a little more 
to say later. However, I conclude my 
statement at this time. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum with the 
proviso that I do not lose my right to 
the floor. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk 
will call the roll. 
The second assistant legislath·e clerk 
proceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at 
the present time there are over 300,000 
U.S. military personnel, including 20,-
000 in the 6th Fleet, stationed in West-
em Europe. Of this number, 128 are 
general flag officers, or one teneral flag 
officer for every 2,343 men. 
That is an introductory statement. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that I may submit an amendment to 
H.R. 6531, a bill to amend the Military 
Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase 
military pay; to authorize military ac-
tive duty strengths for fiscal year 1972, 
and for other purposes; and I further 
ask unanimous consent that, after the 
reading of the amendment-and I do 
this with the approval of the authors of 
the pending amendment-the Senate 
proceed to its immediate consideration. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there 
objection? 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserv-
ing the right to object, the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Montana-
and I only read it a few minutes ago--
is a far-reaching matter. It is highly 
important. It involves international pol-
icies. However, any Member might wish 
to vote on it. I am sure most Members 
want a thorough discussion and debate 
on it. I would not be in a position to 
agree now to make it the pending mat-
ter. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator 
mind withdrawing his amendment so 
that I can offer my amendment and 
then the Senator's amendment could 
follow my amendment? 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I 
be heard on that request? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand the 
Senator from Pennsylvania has a right 
to do so voluntarily if h e wishes to do 
so. 
Mr. STENNIS. Reserving the right to 
objec~ 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Mississippi. 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I sug-
gest to the Senator from Pennsylvania 
before he agrees to withdraw his amend-
ment that there be time for a confer-
ence. I think the amendment of the 
Senator from Pennsylvania. goes to the 
very vitals of this entire bill. The major 
part of the debate on it will affect thE? 
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whole system of the Selective Service Act, 
the entire military setup, and I welcome 
the debate on it, and a vote on it. How-
ever, I really do not think it should be 
set aside now and another amendment 
brought up. 
To that extent I appeal to the Senator 
from Pennsylvania in the interest of 
orderly procedure that he not withdraw 
his amendment. He told me on Friday 
and he told me this morning that he 
wanted to bring up his amendment. I 
had asked him not to at that time. I told 
him I would let him know when the 
committee had gotten near the point 
of making its initial presentation. I noti-
fied him to that effect. I hope that now 
he does not withdraw his amendment, 
certainly until we can have a conference. 
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Is the Senator 
willing to have a conference on it now? 
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I will go ahead with 
my speech while the Senators confer. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Montana is recognized. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, has 
the amendment been read? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has 
not been read. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask that the 
amendment be read. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
amendment will be read by the clerk. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I withdraw my re-
quest in view of the situation that de-
veloped, but I want the amendment read. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The re-
quest for the amendment to be offered 
for purposes of parliamentary action is 
withdrawn and the amendment will be 
read for the information of the Senate. 
The amendm~>nt was read, as follows: 
At the end of the bill add a new title a.s 
follows: 
TITLE IV-REDUCTION OF UNITED 
STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE 
SEc. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds 
that the number of United States mllitary 
personnel stationed in Europe can be signifi-
cantly reduced without endangering the se-
curity of Western Europe, and that such are-
duction would have a favorable effect on this 
Nation's balance-of-payments problem and 
would help avoid recurring international 
monetary crises involving the value of the 
dollar abroad. It is therefore ~he purpose of 
this section to provide for such a reduction 
at the earllest practicable date. 
(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress 
may be u sed after December 31, 1971, for the 
purpose of supporting or maintaining in 
Europe any mllltary personnel of the United 
States In excess of 150,000. 
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the 
Senator from Montana yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that my name be 
added as a cosponsor of the amendment 
of the Senator from Montana, if the Sen-
ator has no objection. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there 
objection? The name of the Senator from 
Alaska is added as a cosponsor of the 
amendment. 
The Senator from Montana is recog-
nized. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the 
essenti·al purpose of this amendment is 
to bring about a reduction of approxi-
mately 150,000 Armed Forces personnel 
below the number presently stationed in 
Europe. 
In short, the amendment says it is too 
late for the U.S. Government to keep 
playing the role of Wilkins Micawber, 
hoping that something will soon "turn 
up." Something has indeed turned up: a 
full-blown monetary crisis created in 
large part by our failure to deal deci-
sively with our enormous balance-of-
payments deficits. These in turn derive 
mainly from our military expenditures 
in Vietnam, in Europe, and elsewhere 
around the world. 
Mr. President, for several years now 
other Senators and I who have long felt 
that an excessive number of American 
troops and dependents are stationed in 
Europe have been strenuously cautioned 
against precipitous action to reduce 
those totals. Several times I have intro-
duced resolutions making clear our be-
lief in the need for a substantial reduc-
tion in our forces in Europe. Several times 
I have held off action because I have not 
wished to disrupt an allegedly delicate 
situation, or to give any justification to 
those who might charge that we in the 
Senate have not given the most mature 
and informed consideration to the prob-
lem. 
The cautionary voices urging us to 
wait and see have raised a variety of 
reasons for inaction. Again and again 
we are told there can be no question but 
that the present level of American troops 
in Europe in time must be reduced, and 
reduced substantially. But the caution-
ary voices keep murmuring that now is 
not the time. 
We have been told that so-called off-
set agreements with West Germany are 
going far toward closing the serious U.S. 
balance-of-payments deficits incurred by 
our military expenditures in Europe. Yet, 
on examination we have found that much 
of the offset payment has turned out to 
be relatively short-term German loans 
to the United States. These merely post-
pone our problem; they do nothing to 
resolve it. 
Then at the NATO ministerial meetiHJ 
late last year quite a different tack was 
attempted. In December we were told 
that our European allies would be mak-
ing a special effort to strengthen their 
forces. As part of the supposed bargain 
the United States would not only main-
tain its current levels of forces intact, 
but would also contribute to the projected 
increased effectiveness of the alliance's 
military position. Once again, close ex-
amination reveals that the much touted 
special effort over the period of the next 
5 years at best will represent rather 
modest progress. 
Over each of the next 5 years the 
Europeans together plan to spend an 
additional $100 million towar·d improv-
ing their force levels and readiness, 
while a similar sum would be invested 
in infrastructure-that is, the facilities 
located on European soil for logistical 
and related purposes. In any one of the 
next 5 years the combined extra Euro-
pean effort would amount to roughly 
$200 million, or about one-ninth of the 
annual U.S. balance-of-payments deficit 
incurred as a result of America111 military 
expenditures in Europe. This, to me, is 
not a very impressive effort when one 
considers how much energy and time 
went into argUing for an increase which 
would encourage Americans to believe 
that the corner had at last been turned. 
When other arguments fail-as in-
deed they have--the executive branch al-
ways seems to fall back on something 
which we can only call the psychological 
argument. We have been lectured con--
stantly over the last year on the theme 
that West German efforts to promote 
detente, under the heading of "ostpoli-
tik," should not be disrupted or endan-
gered in the slightest by any action 
which would affect the balance of mili-
tary forces in Europe. No one is more 
interested than I in promoting a peace-
ful dialog between the Soviet Union and 
the Western allies leading to a perma-
nent and reliable stabilization of the 
European scene. However, I have never 
believed that this is a short-term prop-
osition or process. If we are to wait for 
the ft,Jl success of ostpolitik before we 
can change our force levels in Europe, 
then we may have to be prepared to en-
dure a stalemate which could last for 
one or two decades, or even longer, be-
cause some of the arguments against 
this proposal to reduce our forces in 
Europe seem to have a ling of perma-
nency about them, and some of my col-
leagues feel that U.S. troops should re-
main in Europe ad infinitum. 
The rclat~d point is also stressed that 
we must take no action which could 
jeopardize the political position of the 
Brandt government in Germany. There 
is no question about the depth of the 
Chancellor's commitment to the West. 
Yet, it is conjectured that some other 
German lender in the future might try 
to work out a unilateral deal with the 
Soviet Union at the expense of the Alli-
ance if the United States were to jar 
the supposedly delicate psychological bal-
ance of the German people. Frankly, 
this sort of argument is not flattering 
to the German people--anymore than 
comparable speculation abroad is to us 
about the possible faithlessness of the 
United States. Both countries should re-
sent and reject these hypotheses. Indeed, 
one could turn the argument around and 
say that, since the leaders of the two 
largest German political parties are un-
quested advocates of Western European 
unity, it would be better to scale down 
the U.S. presence while they are in of-
fice and can h~ndle any possible reper-
cussions. 
Mr. President, today we are seeing the 
high cost of postponement of considera-
tion of urgent problems. Time and again 
Members of this body have taken the 
floor to discuss our persistent and in-
creasing balance-of-payments deficits, 
to urge immediate attention to the prob-
lem, and to prophesy critical times 
ahead if matters are left for the most 
convenient time. The distinguished sen-
ior Senator from Missouri (Mr. f'YMING-
TON) in particular, and also the distin-
guished senior Senator from Illinois (Mr. 
PERCY), have given us an excellent lead 
in warning against just what has come to 
pass; yet another international monetary 
upheaval. 
Last year the United States incurred 
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a record balance-of-payments deficit of 
over $10 billion on an official settlements 
basis. Instead of taking the lead in call-
ing for early and dramatic measures to 
overhaul the system which could pro-
duce such disruptive deficits, the execu-
tive branch devoted most of its efforts to 
figw·ing out different means of comput-
ing the balance-of-payments formula 
and to assunng us that the situation-
although admittedly less than desira-
ble-was tolerable. 
Unfortunately, the financial commu-
nity in WestCJn Europe has taken quite 
a different \'iew of the international 
monetary scene. While we have been 
worrying about the fancied psychological 
problems of West Germany, Europeans 
have been worrying about the very real 
problems of the United States. When 
they looked at this country they have 
seen mounting waves of unrest breaking 
on a beach where the administration, 
figmativcly speaking, sits like King 
Canute, with arms folded, saying that 
it would not be moved by the urgency of 
the s!Luation. Confidence in the willing-
ness of the United States to put its house 
in order has certainly not been increased 
by our display of subborn petulance. It 
is too bad we have forgotten the miginal 
point of the story was that of an astute 
ruler showing his adoring courtiers that 
his power had limits. 
In fact, the European reaction 
amounts to a vote of no confidence in 
the international monetary policies pur-
sued by our Government. Ironically, 
taking a lead in giving expression to this 
sentiment has been the country which 
h as most strongly encouraged us to keep 
on playing the same world role, and to 
keep our forces in Europe intact. When 
the chips are down it appears that a 
number of our European allies are far 
more interested in their domestic con-
cerns than they are in the international 
scene which they expect us to improve. 
I t seems to me we have been refusing 
to face up to a paradoxical European 
attitude which has persisted for some 
half dozen years. On the one hand, many 
of our European friends constantly urge 
us to maintain unchanged our commit-
ments and ow· military forces. On the 
other hand, they argue strenuously for 
a reduction in our payments deficits, 
which are incurred largely from the 
activities which they say cannot be 
altered. As far as Vietnam Is concerned, 
the NATO Allies offer little advice and 
less help; at least the French do us the 
favor of speaking their minds clearly 
and forcefully in urging withdrawal. 
While a number of palliatives have 
been proposed and applied, our pay-
ments position in Europe and the world 
has deteriorated further. For example, 
in fiscal year 1968 the amount of U.S. 
defense expenditures entering the inter-
national balance of payments in Western 
Europe was about $1.611 billion. In 1969 
the figure fell slightly to $1.586 billion. 
In fi scal year 1970, however, the figure 
had risen again to more than $1.731 
billion. This could hardly be termed 
progress. 
Now we are in a position where we must 
break out of this endless circle of frustra-
tion and take clear-cut action to reduce 
the payments deficits which have weak-
ened international confidence in the dol-
lar. Our European friends have met ur-
gently to discuss means of coping with 
the currency crisis. Their main accom-
plishment was to reject for their own 
individual domestic reasons the compro-
mise proposal put forward by the Com-
mission of the European Community. In 
one case, we find the finance minister 
of a friendly nation avidly seeking the 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar. But there 
is no purpose to be served in complaining 
about the alarms and excursions of the 
international monetary situation. Our 
Government is just as much to blame as 
any other for failing to read the mes-
sage on the walL 
Mr. President, my amendment is de-
signed to bring about early relief to our 
pressing payments deficits abroad. It is 
an amendment which is necessary and 
reasonable. It will permit 150,000 Amer-
ican military personnel still to be sta-
tioned in Europe. Further, if these troops 
that will be returned are disbanded upon 
their return to the United States, it will 
represent a further gain for our budget, 
as well as our balance of payments. The 
financial savings in that case could well 
be as high as $1 Y2 billion. 
It may be argued by some that this 
leaves uncertain the intentions of the 
United States with respect to the defense 
of Western Europe and with respect to 
the numbers of American forces for that 
defense. But if there is one cardinal for-
eign policy tenet agreed upon by virtu-
ally all Americans, it is the proposition 
that Western Europe, for a variety of 
reasons, must not be allowed to come 
under Soviet or other external domina-
tion. I will not go into all the many argu-
ments we have made publicly over the 
last few years to support our contention 
that there is no compelling military ar-
gument for the exact number of forces 
which we now maintain in Europe. In-
stead, I would like to append to this 
statement an article on this subject by 
a recently retired Army officer, Edward 
L. King, written for the October 1970 
issue of the Forum periodical, publi"hed 
by the Ripon Society. Mr. King mf.kes 
many of the same arguments, and I ask 
unanimous consent that the article be 
printed at the conclusion of my remarks 
In the RECORD. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
<See exhibit lJ 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in 
closing these remarks, let me stress that 
I believe my amendment represents a 
constructive move which will respond 
not only to the demands of American 
citizens for greater expenditures at home 
rather than abroad but also to the de-
mands of our European allies for urgent 
American measures to get our payments 
deficits under control. This does not in 
any way represent a withdrawal from 
Western Europe or its defense. It is quite 
simply an illustration of the old French 
saying that one recoils in order to jump 
better. 
Our forces in Europe have been in-
:tl.ated and musclebound, with far more 
logistical than combat capability. It is 
my conviction, and that of many other 
observers-including experienced mili· 
tary men-that trimming away the fa1 
in the form of excess supplies and head· 
quarters will result in a leaner, mon 
mobile, and more efficient combat force 
EXHIBIT 1 
[From the Ripon Futum, October 1970! 
THE U.S. ARMY Il'l EUROPE 
In a recent article I touched on a few o 
the strategic and tactical Implications of th• 
organization and purpose of U.S. Army force: 
In West Germany. Let's now more close!) 
examine these Implications and expand 01 
the questions they raise In regard to U.S. con. 
ventlonal war force levels In Europe. 
ORGANIZATION 
I s the U.S. Army overstaffed In w~st Ger· 
many? One way to figure whether there is fat 
In our European command and force struc-
ture Is to compare It to Army doctrme and 
World War II experience factors. 
In West Germany the Army has stationed 
a total force of approximately 195,000 sol-
diers. Congress and the public were told that 
these soldiers are all required to fight the 
enemy In a conventional war. This force Is 
under the overall conunand of the unified 
(i.e. triservlce) U.S. European Command with 
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. This 
headquarters, heavily stafled with generals 
and admirals, also has an element In NATO 
headquarters In Belgium. In time of peace 
this unified command serves as the sen!OI 
command for all U.S. armed forces In Eu· 
rope, but In t1me of war It performs NATO 
duties. U.S. European Command exercises it~ 
command supervision by passing Joint Chief! 
of Staff (In Washington, D.C.) directives tc 
U.S. A1 my Europe/Seventh Army headquar· 
ters located 38 miles away In Heidelberg 
Germany. In peacetime this hcadqum:ten 
commands all Army forces In West Germany 
In wartime this combined Army headquar-
ters performs both NATO and U.S. commanC: 
functions. 
The next command level Is the corps head-
quarters. (A corps headquarters exercises tac. 
tical command over military operations; it i! 
not normally concerned with administrativE 
support.) In West Germany there are tw< 
U.S. corps headquarters. Additionally, then 
Is another command element approximntelJ 
equal to a corps headquarters which provide! 
logistical support. These three commnnc 
levels (U.S. European Command, U.S. Army, 
Seventh Army, V & VII Corps headquarters) 
pass directives down to the combat divisions 
There are the equivalent of five divisions !1 
West Germany. And once we pass the divl· 
sion heaclquarters of these divisions, we wil 
have finally found the Army units (tll< 
brigades and battalions) that actually en. 
gage In combat. 
All of these command and supply head-
quarters require numerous generals (ovei 
30 In Stuttgart alone), field grade omcen 
and senior NCO's to command and stall 
them. This Is In addition to the large num-
ber of troops required to man them. How 
many men are engaged in these noncom-
batant jobs? 
The best way to answer Is to consider how 
many men are In the five combat divisions. 
Each division at full strength contains 
around 16,000 men. If our combat divisions 
In Europe were at full strength (and they 
seldom have been during Vietnam) there 
would be a total of about 80,000 men as-
signed to them. We can then reasonably 
speculate that the remaining 115,000 men 
(of the 195,000 total force) are serving In 
other than the combat divisions. In other 
words roughly 115,000 men serve In admin-
istrAtive and logistic situations. 
These 115,000 men are not the only ones 
serving In these situations. Each division of 
-about 16,000 men includes only roughly 
7 ,000 soldiers who are assigned the mission 
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or firing at the enemy. The r emaining 9.000 
or so are assigned to administrative com-
mand and logistic support positions within 
th e di1 ision! This means that In terms of 
comb[lt manpower for conventional combat 
the U.S. Army in West Germany has only 
:tbout 40,000 soldiers In Its combat dlvi-
''""" who >Lre assigned to place killing fire 
c 111 the enemy. 
'I here is no valid mili tary reason why the 
Army must organl?c itsel f su that It needs 
O\'er 100,000 men to command and supply 
a combat force of 80,000 soldi!'rs (Of which 
less than half f1re at the enemy). For ex-
ample, Army doctriue Indicates that a corps 
headquarters "'nmmally"' commands two or 
1nore divis ions. In Wnrld \Var II. each coin-
bat corps normally < Olll'Jlnnded an average 
of four divisions. MorNJ\ t•r the U .S. Seventh 
Army commanded no tess t hnn three corps 
durmg World War II ct,nlllnt. 
So why then docs It r!'CJHire two corps 
headquarters anti a field nrmy headquarters 
to command the equlvnlcul of 5 under-
strPngth divisions in peacetime? Because the 
U.S. Army in Wt•st Germany has grown top-
h eavy t !Hough (a) bureaucratic Inertia, 
(b) milicary preference f0r sofl career liv-
ing m Europe rat her than extended periods 
of l1nng in such p laces as Fort Leonn.rd 
Wood. ~llssonri or Fort Polk. Louisiana and 
(CJ cin!J;Ui abdication of control over mil-
llary P• !Icy. At least 50.000 men could be 
brought home from WPst Gcrm:tny without 
rNI HCillg Lhe COil\'CntlOI<al <"<>lllbat capabil-
Ity of tile existlll~ uS Army presence !! 
those forces were st rca• •lil,ed and efficiently 
organized. command,.d a "' s11pplled. Or, I! 
present troop le,els lla'' t.o he mnlntau1cd, 
this much n1nnpower c •t·Id be convcrt.cd 
!ro1n fa t to combat muse'•' 
None of these rea,oll jnstlflcs the huge 
c osts incurred to support. the cxist.in(; sys-
tem of organization nnd command . It cost 
2 2 billion In fiscal hJ70, to maintain our 
forcPs in West G ermany. Th1s figure does not 
tndnde the additional co·;ts i•wolved in mov-
Jng. storage auct slilplll"i'l of hot~schold 
goods and automoblles or Lhc military per-
soniH 1 and their dt:pelld• nts Y.bo wr·re auto-
m:ttl<'ally rotated back and f<•rth d u ring fis-
cal Hl70 Much or this rotatiOn IS unneces-
sary and is done on ly for car£'er hnpro\•e-
menh. It 1s also one of the reasons that 
nearlv all Army personnel In Germany are 
l'lther learning their joh or "coasting." wait-
Ing to rotate back to the U.S 
In any event ther!' is no acceptable justi-
fication for obvious military paunch even in 
times of national budgetary surplus, much 
J('ss when inflation munches on tax-dollars 
and domestic programs are forced to exist on 
:,nbsistence Levels. 
PURPOSF' 
The "rganizatlon of US. Army forces in 
Enrope 1s unsatisfactory In terms of costs 
and manpower utll!?atlon. Even worse are 
the prohl!'ms which are created uy their 
mis!,ioll. 
The US. combat units-In consort with 
other NATO forces-are suppnr,ed to be able 
to fight a conventional war against Soviet 
and satellite troops. Let us assume that our 
10~.000 men were org:\IHZCd and commanded 
efficiently. Would there be a reasonable pros-
pect that they could do what they arc sup-
posed to do successfully'! The answer is prob-
ably not. 
Part of this answer 1s prompted by the Lo-
cation and sheer numerical advantage en-
joyed by their adversary: nearly 200 Soviet 
and East European divisions (about 2 mllllon 
men) could be thrown Into battle against 18 
or 20 NATO d ivisions (about 350,000 men), 
There are other d isadvantages. 
ILL POSITIONED 
Relative positioning of forward units. 
Within sight of many ot the autobahns lead-
ing westward through East Germany, for-
ward Soviet divisions are positioned In aus-
tere, mobile Lank and truck parks. The dis-
tance from a soldier 's tent or hut, to his tank, 
truck or armored vehicle Is a matter of min-
utes. contrast this with the positioning or 
U .S. Army forward units: the troops live in 
barrack compounds often removed a half-
mile or more from their tanks and vehicles. 
T h e truck parks themselves are not always 
immediately accessible to major roads. The 
time n('eded to get our troops on the road is 
1nore than mtJHtles. 
U.::l. dh•b1ons are st111 romlortably pos!-
tionf:d in the World War II occupaLLon-zone 
pos itions that they took up when they ar-
l"lved in Southern Germany In 1950 51 during 
the dark days of t he Korean war. But stra-
tegic considerations would most l!kely moti-
vate the Soviet armored forces to strike bold-
ly across the fiat North German pl:t!ns along 
the historic !nvat!on route to the Ruhr and 
the English Channel ports. U.S. Army forces 
would undoubtedly be needed to help d efend 
n ot only the industrial heart of Europe but 
also to protect the1r own supply lifelines 
which dunng war run oaek to the channel 
pons. To :.ccompllsll this, they would have 
to move consiC:erable dls•ancP" to the north 
to reach viable battle podit•ons. If a sudden 
attack occ-urted, they woulct have to make 
this movement over roads jammpu with o ther 
NATO troops, 0\"er run wlcn millions of relu-
gees (many uf whom would be t heir own 
wives and child ren attempting to Ilec) and 
constantly attacked by low-flying enemy air-
craft. Time WOllld be critical In such a north-
ward movement; only hours would be avail -
able to attempt to Intercept and stem the 
Soviet advance. Yet during the Berlin Cnsi~ 
of 1961 when such a movement \\as conoid-
erect, days not hours were estimated :u; b e-
Ing required. And this movement would have 
been conducted under peacetime conditlons! 
Even asstmllng that U.S. Army comhat. cle-
men ts have reached improved maximums of 
mobili ty and flexibility since 1961 , exhibiting 
these qual!ties would require absolute tacti-
cal air superiority. I know of no military 
planner who hone.;tly assumes that t he U.S. 
Air F o rce will at...laiu :;nch absolute snperior-
lty (which It enjoyed over Western Europe 
in 1945) until a considerable period after 
the opening of hostilities. And there are some 
who doubt 1f it could ever attain such a de-
gree of super!onty. 
But If we assume that U.S. forces will 
have absolute air super1orlty, could our 80,-
000 combat troops (I.e. 40 .000 who fire on the 
enemy) plus approximately 260,000 NATO 
combat troops, reasonably be expected to 
stop the advance of Communist Bloc trc JS? 
(Before answering we must remember that 
H we fight a conventional war in Europe !t 
w!ll be with the forces already there. The 
Czechoslovakian Invasion showed that we can 
no longer count on a comfortable mobiliza-
tion period during which, In the best tradi-
tions or World Wars I and II, more combat 
troops can be flown or shipped to Europe 
from the U.S.). Mos t military professionals 
privately agree that the answer Is no. How-
ever. the Army several years ago devised a 
\'Cry simple solution to this problem tor 
Congress and the public. They can give an 
affirmative answer because they alloc~tte "tac-
tical" (I.e. low-yield ) nuclear weapons to the 
conventional forces in Europe. 
Simple. Now our conventional f"Orces can 
offset the Soviet and satellite manpower 
advantage and delay t heir advance westward 
by exploding large numbers or nuclear 
devices against them !rom the very first 
m oments or battle. 
MOST UNCONVENTIONAL 
The Army has been training for years in 
Europe on the basis of such plans. Simulated 
use or nuclear weapons Is written into the 
scenario or most major unit training exer-
cises. In on e NATO field training maneuver, 
the Stars and Stripes n ewspaper reported 
that largt> numbers or simula ted nuclear 
weapons were u ,cct . Wll,tt was not reported 
was that while nuclear devices turned a 
losing conventional t'ffo:t i?lto a winning one, 
It also would have turned a conventional 
war Into a nntlt'ar one And at the same 
tlme it was estmJ:tled by W<·st German press 
sources that about (jj r 'Jcent of West Ger-
many would hnve !Jeen ucstroyed. In dis-
cus;Jng low- yield "'tacllc;tl"' nuclear weapons 
we should remember that. I he average "tac-
tical" lluclear weapon has the explosive force 
of roughly one-quarter to one-half the 
de,truct1ve power of the Hiroshima A-bomb. 
Strictly m terms of physical clamage and 
Indiscriminate los~ of CIVIlian and mili tary 
i!vcs. the one-sided usc of such weapons can 
scarcely be called conventwnal. 
And can we be sure that the Soviets would 
not use at least equivalent nuclear weapons 
In rPta!iatHm? One cannot beliCh' that the 
S ,,·,ds w11! fight with their rifles and con-
\"entional artillery while we destroy whole 
eli\ 1 !uns with l.ctctlcal nuclear weapons. 
THE PLIGHT OF DEPL:-.!DENTS 
In the e\"cnt of hostilities the necessity of 
twlng nul"lcar weapons first could present 
the United Stales with a grave national 
clilemma. The Prcstdcnt would be faced with 
1hr choice of authorizing the military com-
ll1H1Hir>r in Europe to use nuelear weapons 
( ol H I tlH rcby opj·n a ll11Clcar war ) or deny 
t ht 1r t'sc and rhk the loss nr a. ltcld arrHy 
nnu I he lll•es Jf n e.uly 250 000 U .S. serv!ce-
tlH n and tlH jf farnl11es. The choice betwe<'n 
inili:l.tillt""' nuC'lear escalation or failing l.) 
protl'rt Ill•' lives o! American fiJ!ht!ng men 
W\Jlllfl n 1t. l.JP an attractive one for any 
l'n· -ldl·n!. Y<·l CI"Cry P resident for the past 
tift """ years h:>.s been fncecl with this pos-
!-;I bill i.y as a rpsull- of our etrort t.o maintn.ln 
tlte fictinn of n con\·enUonal war l'apac1ty in 
Lurope. 
'I he ch•licr is <'•1ll1Jllil"ated by the fact that 
wh • and chilclr<•n nf U.S. servict)lncn would 
be the almost Inevitable victims of our 
tactiCal n uclrar weapons. If there is a warn-
ing period from hostilities being some of the 
225,000 dependents could be evacuated by 
air and private automobile to •·satehavens." 
If hostllit!e~ begin suddenly-and there is no 
reason to bl'!icve the Soviets intend to pr.l-
v!de convenient advance notice of their :.t-
tack most officials are convinced that the 
majonty of the military dependents would 
have to "standfast" where they are llvlng. 
These dependents would be left to fend for 
themselves, as would their less fortunate 
civilian countrymen who are working or 
travel!ng privately in Europe and who are not 
considered for assistance by U.S. armed 
forces. The soldier-husbands of the m!lltary 
dependents would have to fall back toward 
Lhe Rhine River whlle covering their delay-
lllg action with "tact!c"al" unclear weapons. 
In short, firing nuclear shells and rockets 
on the Soviet u nits, hundreds of thousands 
of West German civilians and on their own 
families. (In spite of this potential disaster, 
the military opposed President Eisenhower's 
courageous and mllltnry sound decision In 
late 1960 to stop further movement or de-
pendents to Europe. This decision was re-
scinded by President Kennedy In late 1961 
In response to opposl tlon from the armed 
services, even though no effect! ve dependent 
evacuation plan had been devised.) 
We have permitted the continuation of 
our conventional structure to placate the 
West German government, not to fight a 
conventional war. Our military leaders have 
advocated retaining these forces because they 
have provided Increased promotions and 
pleasant duty stations. These miLitary Lead-
ers have been comfortable In the knowledge 
that they would n ot really be expected to 
fight a conventional war against the formida-
ble Red Army, because they could quickly 
change such a war Into a nuclear one in 
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which the U.S., until recently, held a vast 
advantage. In other words political ex~<U­
ency and parochial service Interests have been 
allowed to supercede national best· interests: 
The presence of our over 200,000-man con-
ventional force In Europe Is fraught with 
potentially dangerous risks to our national 
security and Immense problems of organl::a-
tlon and m.lsslon. It Is long pnst time for 
concerned civilians and military officers to 
begin the very difficult task of stre.tmltning 
our force structures and more respo:~.~;b>l•t\ 
rationalizing their purpose In Europe. Per-
haps the recent signing of the West Gcrm·u•-
Sovlet nonaggression pact marks the histori-
cal juncture tor our work to begin In E':u·ncsL. 
EDWARD L. KING. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the abse)jPe of a quorum. 
H.R. 7931. An act to amend the District of 
Columbia Code with respect to the adminis-
tration of small estates, and !or other pur-
poses. 
THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE 
A(.r 
The Senate continued with the consid-
eration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend 
the Military Selective Service Act of 
1967; to increase military pay; to author-
ize military active duty strengths for fts-
c!IJ year 1972; and for other purposes. 
AMENDMENT NO. 86 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I call 
up my amendment. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
amendment of the Senator from Mon-
tana \vill be stated. 
The assistant legislative clerk read as 
follows: 
At the end of the bill add a new title as 
follows: 
TITLE IV- REDUCTION OF UNITED 
STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EU-
ROPE 
SEC. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds 
that the number of Un ited States military 
personnel stationed In Europe can be sig-
nificantly reduced without endangering t he 
security of Western Europe, and that such a 
reduction would have n. favorable effect on 
this Nation's balance or p.\ymeuts problem 
and would help avoid recurring International 
monetary crises Involving the value of the 
dollar abroad. It is therefore the purpose of 
this secclon to provide for such a reduction 
at the earliest practicable date. 
(b) No funds appropriated by the Con-
gress may be used after December 31, 1971, 
for the purpose of supporting or maintaining 
In Europe any military personnel of the 
United States In excess of 150,000. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk 
will call the roll. 
The second assistant legislative clerk 
proceeded to call the roll. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
objection, it is so ordered. 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we 
have order? 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ate will be in order. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I re-
quested the prepartion last week of a 
memorandum on this overall question of 
troops in Europe by Mr. Edward L. King. 
Mr. King has had extensive opportun-
ity to study these questions both as a 
staff planner within the military and as 
a sensible and concerned citizen since 
his retirement. He brings to bear a clear-
ness of presentation of the arguments 
and a crispness of focus and recommen-
dation that should benefit the entire 
Senate. 
The memorandum is in every respect 
outstanding. I ask unanimous consent 
that this memorandum of Mr. King be 
printed at this point in the RECORD, so 
as, in effect to follow my previous re-
marks. 
There being no objection, the memo-
randum was ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
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RETENTION OF U .S. FORCE LEVELS IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 
OVERALL PROBLEM 
Can the number o! U .S. Armed Forces 
personnel stationed In Europe be substan-
tially reduced without scrloulsy weakening 
the deterrent capability of the NATO mili-
tary structure? 
SOME FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 
a. Over 300,000 U .S. military personnel 
(Including 20,000 In the 6th Fleet) are sta-
tioned In Western Europe. 
1. Of thts number 128 are general/ flag of-
fleers-or one general flag officer !or every 
2,343 men. · 
2. About 250,000 o! these troops are as-
signed to the tri-servlce U.S. guropean Com-
mand (USEUCOM). The De~artment o! De-
fense has Indicated that hal! of these as-
signed forces are combat personnel and the 
rest are support. Over 170,000 of the EUCOM 
total are U.S. Army troops. 
3. Major USEUCOM combat elements are 
4 \13 Army division d eployed in West Ger-
many. These divisions are not o.t full 
strength. According to Army Tables or Or-
ganization and Equipment the o.ggrego.te 
full strength o! each of these d 1 v1slons would 
be around 16.300 men. It costs approximately 
$185 million to mamtain one army dlvtsion 
on o\·erscas r eacettme active duty for a year. 
4. There are about 113,500 Army and Air 
Force personnel stationed In the Conti-
nental U.S. committed to NATO. In Europe 
about 2,000 American personnel are engaged 
In maintaining and bervlcing prestocked 
equipment to be used by these committed 
forces. 
b. There are now approximately 7,000 U.S. 
nuclear warheads stored In Europe. 
c. During fiscal yenr 1971 It cost approxi-
mately $14 billion !or the support or U.S. 
general purpose forces' In Europe and the 
forces in the U.S. committed to NATO. 
1. This total figure Includes opeartlng 
costs and estimated annual investment In 
equipment and military construction. 
2. Annual operating cost to maintain U.S. 
forces In western Europe is approximately 
$2.9 billion. 
d. U .S. defense expenditures entering the 
International balance o! payments In NATO 
countries (Including Canada) in fiscal year 
1970 are estimated at approximately $2 bil-
lion, with about $1.1 billion being spent In 
the Federal Republic of Germany. 
1. For every soldier removed from Germany, 
an approximate saving o! $1,650 In Individ-
ual exepndltures on the European economy 
can he realized. 
2. The withdrawal and deactivation o! 2 
mechanized divisions now stationed In Eu-
rope would result In annual savings o! about 
$1 billion. 
e. The U.S. forces In Europe have over 79 
real property locations In seven countries, 
that represent a total U.S. Investment In ex-
cess of $204.5 million. 
f. Payment o! land taxes In Great Britain 
and Western Germany amounts to $2.9 mil-
lion annually. 
g. Approximately hal! o! the European 
Command's transportation needs must be ac-
complished by European commercial sources 
at a cost of $29 million In 1969. 
h. Expenditures !or employment o! Euro-
pean local nationals by U.S. forces amounted 
to $265 mllllon from appropriated fundS in 
calendar year 1969. 
1. Until March 1971, U.S. citizens were In 
most cases excluded !rom filling local hire 
vacancies. 
1. Total operating costs o! U .S. Army, Navy 
and Air Force European Commands In :ftscal 
year 1970 were approximately ta7.SS mllllon. 
During the same year U .B. operating coats 
o! NATO headquarters were •10,6~3,033.00. 
1. These operating costa represent only a 
fraction o! the tot1111 cost o! each command. 
For example, the headquarters operating cost 
for U.S. Army Europe was only 2.30 per cent 
of the totn.l fund It was provided o! $1,761,-
000,000.00. 
2. In addition to these operating costs the 
9 U.S. Army Command headquarters, for ex-
ample, contained 26 generals, 1,286 other 
officers and 1,908 enlisted men all drawing 
higher salaries while performing command 
or staff jobs. 
j . While the percentage o! U.S. GNP going 
to defense has increased over the past 20 
years, that of our NATO allies has declined. 
k. Major NATO ground forces presently 
available In the center region of Europe con-
sist of 22 division equivalents. 
1. This total Includes the 4\1:, U.S. divisions 
but does not Include two French divisions 
not committed to NATO but present In West 
Germany. 
2. The Lisbon Conference o! 1950 called 
tor a. total NATO force of 90 divisions. 
3. Few. I! any. of the 22 NATO divisions are 
at full combat strength In men or equipment. 
For example, there are shortagPs of trained 
NCO's and junior officers In some of the West 
German divisions. 
1. Soviet forces In E'lst Germany are estl-
m"ted by the Defense Departmen t to number 
over 300,000 troops deployed In excess of 20 
armored and motorized di visions. Additional 
Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Hungary bring the total Soviet forces 
outside the Soviet borders to over 500,000 
men. 
1. Estimates by SHAPE Indicate that the 
Warsaw Pact forces have twice as many divi-
sions In the center region as NATO. 
2. Warsaw Pact forces have been estimated 
to be able to mobilize more than 175 divi-
sions. 
3. The SHAPE Commander has stated that 
when "fully mobilized" Warsaw Pact tank 
forces outnumber NATO's by 3 ' to 1. 
4. The EUCOM Commander has stated that 
the Soviets "have additional forces In Rus-
sia which can move forward rapidly" to re-
Inforce the forces deployed In Poland, Hun-
gary, Czechoslovakia and East Germa ny. 
m. Article 5 or the North Atlantic Treaty 
provides that each member may "take such 
action as It deems necessary" and It can act 
Individually and in concert with other parties 
In the event o! an armed attack on a mem-
ber state. The parties do not commit them-
selves necessarily to take mil1tary action to 
repel any attack. 
n. Article 11 of the NATO Treaty stipulates 
that the provisions of the Treaty shall be 
carried out "In accordance with their respec-
tive constitutional processes." 
o. Article 3 o! the Treaty stlpulatee that 
members agree to main and develop their 
Individual and collective capacity to resist 
attack. But no specific means are expressed 
for meeting thts obligation. 
Discussion pro and con of substantially 
reducing U.S. troop levels ln Europe 
Countless arguments have been advanced 
why It Is not feasible or possible, to reduce 
present U .S. troop levels In Europe. Gener-
ally these arguments follow fixed patterns 
and are based on hypothetical assumptions 
and predictions. A synthesis o! these con 
arguments can be grouped as follows: 
1. The U.S. Depe.rtmenta o! State and De-
fense concept that the Soviets might risk a 
military move In Europe l! they believed 
American strategic nuclear power hll!d been 
checked and NATO conventional forces were 
seriously weakened. 
2. A rigid concomitant belief by these two 
U.S. Departments In the doctrine of flexible 
response, which poses present U.S. conven-
tional troop levels as a necessity to counter 
any conventional war attack by Warsaw Pact 
troops without an early resort to nuclear 
weapon& 
&. As p&rt of this argument the case 1s 
also made that NATO conventional forces 
must be maintained at current levels so they 
can effectively meet any low level Soviet or 
Warsaw Pact military "probe" of the NATO 
area without having to go to nuclear war to 
counter such a probing action. 
b. Also cited as support for this argument 
are the agreed NATO COl . tngencles o! ( 1) 
limited unexpected conflicts which could give 
rise to larger hostilities, (2) crises preceded 
by a period of political tension which could 
occur after a period o! several weeks or 
months. It Is advanced that these contin-
gencies preclude a thin forward defense be-
cause such a defense would Invite "probes", 
while a balanced posture makes them less 
likely and In effect deters all such options. 
3. The belle! that any substantial with-
drawals would set In motion a chain of 
causation that would ultimately unravel the 
the entire NATO alliance. 
4. Concern t.ha.t the psychological shock 
on our European allies (particularly the 
West German) of a substantial reduction of 
U.S. troops would be devastating to the1r 
morale and would Inevitably lead to eventual 
Soviet dominance In Western Europe. This 
r esult Is predicated on the prem ise that any 
substantial withdrawal of Amencan forces 
would be the start of reduced European force 
levels and cause the Europeans to lose con-
fidence In the significance of their own 
armed forces ability to deter Soviet attack. 
This would then cause them to seek n burned 
accommodation with the Svolet Union. 
a.. As an adjunct to this argument it is 
also postulated that a substantial U.S. force 
reduction would (In the minds of the Euro-
peans) signal a return to U.S. isolationism 
and Indicate that the U.S . would not defend 
Western Europe militarily. This Is , iewed ns 
the rationale for a concurrent rise or Sov1ct 
lnfiuence and eventual d omination of West-
ern Europe. 
b. Another variation of this argument Is 
the West Germany position that substantial 
U .S. troop cuts would demoraltze Western 
European public opinion and convert the 
current moOd of detente with the Soviets 
Into one o! appeasement. 
5. The conviction that unilateral force 
reductions would weaken our hand In the 
current hope o! negotiating with the Warsaw 
Pact countries for mutual balanced troop 
reductions. 
6. Belle! that dollar savings Inherent In a 
substantial troop reduction In Europe would 
be insignificant In relation to the risk to our 
national security. 
7. State and Defense contention that forces 
approaching current levels must remo.ln In 
Europe since forces hastily returned during 
a crtsls are not as effective as those stationed 
In Europe. 
a. A buffer to this argument Is made by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff a.nd the SHAPE 
Commander General Goodpaster, who argue 
that It Is not feasible to reduce even the 
logistics "tall" of the U.S. forces in Europe. 
They consider that such support troops are 
vital for the time when additional u.s. 
troops are flown to Europe during a crisis. 
They further contend that troops should not 
be reduced, but I! cuts must be made, they 
should be made In combat forces rather than 
support forces. 
8. Department or State belle! that an over-
rld!Ilf!' political argument against substantial 
reductions artsea out or the transitional na-
ture of the early 1970's In Europe and that 
troop cuts should not be made during this 
transitional periOd !or fear of IntrOducing a 
d estabilizing factor, which would seriously 
limit our capacity to achieve effectively an 
optimum future relationship with Western 
Europe. · 
In considering the counterweight pro B.lgu-
ments for ma.klng a substantial troop reduc-
tion, It Is necessary to measure the above con. 
a.rguments against a criteria of what these 
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U.S. troops actually do In a oombat sense to 
defend the national security. And within 
that oontext to critically analyze the basic 
validity of the counter arguments advanced. 
The article attached as Appendix 1 covers 
some of the specific problems that relate to 
our conventional troop deployments In Eu-
rope and Is an overview of what our troops 
actually do. Brlefiy stated, our 4Y, diviSions 
deployed In West Germany are a delaying 
force which Is badly positioned and Insuffi-
cient to accompllsh its primary mission of 
retarding Soviet ground advance Into West-
ern Europe . Due to its inferiority in numbers 
of actual combat soldiers, poor tactical or-
ganization and pos1t1oning, It must basically 
rely on tactical nuclear weapons for any 
h ope of successfully accomplishing Its mis-
sion, and In fact for Its own salvation In the 
event of a determln~d attack by the Red 
Army. 
Anyone considering the argument against 
substantial troop reductions should do so 
against the background of the above-men-
tioned negative facets of our European con-
ventional troop deployments. From that 
point 1t then becomes possible to more per-
ceptlvely answer the arguments. Briefly, 
those answers can be stated as follows: 
Analysis of Con Argument 1, that Soviets 
might attack after checkmating American 
strategic nuclear power and in the event 
of a weakening of our present conventional 
forces 
The two substantive points made do not 
:factually fit with the actual conditions they 
postulate. For example, the so-called check-
Ing of American strategic nuclear power 
through nuclear weapons parity (and It 
should be remembered that latest lntellt-
gence reports credit the U.S. with 4,000 nu-
clear warheads to the Soviet's 1800) or arms 
limitation, does not remove the ultimate 
threat of nuclear war and mutual destruc-
tion at the option of either of the super-
powers. It Is reasonable to assume that the 
Soviets are quite aware that any mllttary 
move Into Western Europe would be looked 
upon by us as a threat to our vital Interests. 
They would make such a move only after 
carefully calculating the nuclear balance and . 
probable weapons, not the current conven-
tional troop levels which they already know 
they can handily defeat In conventional 
battle. It Is (and will continue to be) the 
weight of American nuclear response and 
the possibility of mutual national destruc-
tion that would ensue, that restrains any 
Soviet predilection toward military adven-
tures In Europe. 
It is this fear far more than It Is the 
numbers of men. planes, tanks and guns 
that they would face In making such a move. 
In a historical context 1t should be remem-
bered that the Red Army drove several mil-
lion of the Nazi Whermachts' finest combat 
veterans back Into Western Europe In 1945, 
and In the process lost millions of their own 
population. It Is Inconceivable to my mind 
to imagine that this same people and Army, 
in the foreseeable future, will this soon after 
those staggering numbers Of dead, be ln-
cllned to launch an aggressive war into West-
ern Europe and accept the countless deaths 
that a nuclear (or conventional) war would 
surely bring. Conversely, it is equally un-
llkely that a people who have sustained and 
recovered from such previous monumental 
losses In war would long be deterred from a 
military action by the prospect or fighting 
2 or 4 Y,, or 20 U.S. divisions In conventional 
battle; If that was the only alternative to a 
direct threat to the continued existence o:f 
Mother Russia. 
We should remember the Russians tradi-
tionally are a brave, but not :foolhardy, 
people. I fail to see the rationality In an argu-
ment that a bureaucratic Soviet government 
and its anned forces would, or oould, call on 
their people to again accept mlllions of dead 
solely for the purpose o:f an expansionistic 
military grab o:f Western Europe. This files 
in the face of all logic and most past Euro-
pean history. 
Analysis of Con Argument 2, that the credi-
bility of the doctrine at ftexibile response 
depends on present troop levels 
This Is a specious argument that has been 
used long beyond the time it was true. It Is 
a military justification for maintalning large 
numbers of Anny troops (with the accom-
panying high-rank justifying headquarters 
and support commands and career-rewarding 
overseas base II vlng) stationed lndeflni tely 
In Central Europe . It is a. specious argument 
because present troop levels do not In fact 
offer a valid fiexible response to a deter-
mined Soviet conventional attack at any 
level of force or purpose. But rather are too 
weak to effectively react (the Berlin Crisis 
of 1961 Is an excellent example of this weak-
ness when the strongest conventional reac-
tion we dared make to the challenge of the 
Berlin Wall and closing of the Autobahn to 
Berlin, was to dispatch one less-than-
brigade-strength force to Berlin and this 
force wns then lgnomillously forced to dis-
mount from its vehicles Inside East Ger-
m~ny and be counted by Soviet officers be-
fore being permitted to pass to Berlln). At 
the same time this force Is too large to per-
mit effective fiexlblllty In the manner of U.S. 
response to any level of Soviet mill tary ac-
tion. 
For example, under the provisions of Arti-
cles 5 and 11 of the NATO Treaty all members 
mlgh t not choose to react mill tarily to all 
levels of Soviet m1lltary action. Their con-
stitutional processes might inhibit or restrict 
a mllltary response. After the VIetnam ex-
perience public opinion in the U.S. could In 
the near future conceivably not be favorable 
to an automatic m1lltary reaction to all levels 
of Soviet action in Western Europe. However, 
with present force levels stationed In Eurppe, 
the U.S. has no option but to become Involved 
In a conventional mil1tary response. Such a 
conventional response is in fact too weak to 
have much chance of success even with all 
NATO allies participating and foredoomed to 
early failure It some would choor...e not to 
Initially engage In a mil1tary response. 
But this U.S. force Is too large (over 170,000 
men and 149,000 dependents with the 7th 
Army alone) to permit the President any de-
gree of fiexib1llty, or the U.S. constitutional 
processes time to function effectively In re-
gard to a response to almost any form of real 
or imagined Tonkin Gulf-type attack In 
Western Europe. The protection of the ltv"• 
of a field army of U.S. fighting men and their 
fa.r,nil1es, would take precedence over all other 
legitimate questions o:f U.S. national best in-
terests at the time. Because of their numbers 
and p06ltlonlng the U.S. forces would have to 
be engaged in immediate fighting. Yet be-
cause of the Insufficiency of these same num-
bers to fight effectively In conventional bat-
tle, there would be the urgent need to permit 
them to fire the Atomic Demolition Muni-
tions (ADM) mines during the first hours of 
any level of conflict. And there would be the 
:follow-on need for them to quickly resort to 
further tactical nuclear weapon fires to pro-
tect themselves from being pocketed In the 
Southern German sallent. The probability of 
early use of nuclear wapons Is not supposi-
tion. This use is written into the 7th Army 
battle plans. 
In an appearance before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, General Good-
paster alluded to this when he stated: "If 
a.n enemy were to come at us with all the 
forces that the Warsaw Pact could generate 
and were to sustain and press his attack re-
gardless of the losses that he took, after a 
short pericd of. time (ltallcs supplied) it 
would be probable that at least in some 
areas we would have to resort to nuclear 
weapons in order to hold." At another point 
when asked what the NATO situation would 
be 45 days after the outbreak o! hostilities In 
Europe with both sides using only conven-' 
tlop.al forces, General Goodprt.Ster replled, "I 
belleve that thre Is a probability that lt. 
would be necessary to resort to the support 
of tactical nuclear weapo. '"General Lyman 
Lemnitzer, SHAPE Commander from 1962 
to 1969, has stated, "One of the greatest 
problems that would confront NATO today 
would be a large conventional attack. Then 
we would be !aced with a decision to use nu-
clear weapons or be defeated." 
These statements and 7th Army training 
exercises In which simulated tactical nu-
clear weapons are routinely used, would 
seem to discredit the concept that present 
force levels guarantee fiexlblllty and pre-
clude the early resort to nuclear weapons 
The same war plans and exercises also mini-
mize the possiblllty of Umlted Soviet probes 
in favor of preparation for a massive attack 
from Czechoslovakia and through the Fulda 
and Hof "gaps". This mllltary planning Is 
generally predicated on the assumption that 
an attack will follow a period o:f increasing 
tensions which wU! permit the evacuation of 
dependents, repositioning of 7th Army forces 
and reinforcement :from the United States. 
This warning time allows a thickening of 
what Is actually a presently "thin" forward 
defense being planned for a very shallow 
theater .of operations with France no longer 
militarily In NATO. From a factual military 
standpoint present troop levels do not con-
clusively deter the possib1llty of rather un-
likely probes, nor give much probability of 
successfully conventional defense against 
major attack. It would require a much larger 
commitment of troops than either the U.S. 
or our NATO all1es can afford to do this. 
Analysis of Con Argument 3, that any sub-
stantial withdrawal of U.S. forces would 
set in motion an unraveling of the NATO 
alliance 
ThiS argument is purely hypothetical. No 
substantial evidence has been advanced to 
support this thesiS, nor IS there any historical 
precedent which would Indicate that such 
an unraveling o:f the alliance would be the 
inevitable result o:f a phasedown of U.S. troop 
levels to a force o:f, say, 100,000 men. Within 
the alliance there have been past reduc-
tions of U.S. and British force levels, as well 
as the complete withdrawal o:f 10 French 
divisions from the NATO m111tary command. 
This did not set in motion a chain of causa-
tion that has led toward collapse of the alli-
ance. On the contrary, it has caused re-
doubled effort by the remaining members 
to attempt to Improve the ca.pab111ty of the 
alliance. There is no substantive evidence 
to Indicate that :further reduction of U.S. 
troop levels could not be used to stimulate 
Increased European initiative and Interest 
In strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. 
Analysis of Con Argument 4, concerning the 
psychological shock that substantial troop 
reduction would have on our European 
allies and which would result in eventual 
Sovtet dominance over Europe 
The substance of this argument has been 
stated by Martin J. Hlllenbrand, the Assist-
ant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 
"The psychological shock on our European 
allies of an American withdrawal from Eu-
rope would be devastating. The glacial pres-
sures of Soviet power upon a Western Europe 
that knows Itself to be militarily weak and 
politically divided would In due course, In-
sure effective Soviet dominance." Further-
more, Mr. Hlllenbrand Indicated that it 
"would be beyond the capacity o:f diplomacy" 
to convince the Europeans that any substan-
tial withdrawal did not mark the end of 
the effective American commitment to de-
fend Western Europe even i:f 100,000 or more 
U.S. troops remained In Europe. 
The :foundation o:f this view is more emo-
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tiona! conjecture designed to justify a con-
tinuation of the status quo In Europe, than 
an accurate assessment of what Is Jlkely to 
happen If U.S. military force levels are 
reduced. There would of course be some Ini-
tial adverse reaction on the part of our 
European allles to a substantial troop cut. 
But I can not believe It would be of any-
where near devastating proportions to over-
all European morale and will to defend them-
selves (and I have lived In Europe 9 of the 
past 17 years and have friends there). 
I fall to find the logic In the reasoning 
that even an adverse psychological reaction 
to a cut In the number of U.S. troops sta-
toned In Europe could cause citizens of Great 
Britain or West Germany to lose confidence 
In their own national armed forces' abllity 
to defend them. If the level of confidence Is 
truly that low, then NATO Is In fact a thin 
reed. I do not believe this Is the case. Nor 
do I believe that a reduction to a force of 
over 100,000 U.S. troops In Europe would In 
the mind of the average European signal 
a return by the U.S. to pre-World War II 
Isolationism. The European Is quite aware 
that our own people are suffering devastating 
psychological shocks In the cities across 
America. He Is aware of unemployment, fi-
nancial problems and our war-weariness. 
Though he may regret the occurrence of sub-
stantial troop reductions, he Is far more 
likely In the long run to understand the rea-
sons that require that they be made, than 
be Is to hysterically lose heart and turn to 
an accommodation with the Russians. We 
fall to understand the worldlines and ma-
turity of the European people when we give 
serious credence to such unreasoned behavior 
on their part. 
In consideration of a remaining force of 
over 100,000 U.S. soldiers In Europe, our con-
tinued nuclear guarantees and the massive 
·capital Investment and control exercised by 
U.S. firms doing business In Western Europe; 
It Is highly unrealistic to conclude that a 
reduction of two divisions from West Ger-
many will automatically trigger a rise of 
Soviet Influence throughout Western Europe. 
H numbers of divisions were the criteria for 
a position of dominating Influence In West-
ern Europe, the Soviets would have long held 
such a position. It should be recognized 
that a substantial withdrawal of American 
business enterprise would do more to pro-
mote the Impact of a Soviet domination tn 
Western Europe than the removal of a few 
clivlslons. 
The first steps toward a European 
(chiefly west German) detente with Russia 
have been made. France has previously made 
.ln attempt to achieve some form of detente 
1 with the Soviet Union. Neither of these 
1 ~teps have produced any notice ble demoral-
tzatlon of the Western European people. 
French efforts under DeGaulle at wooing 
Russia did not create any widespread feel-
Ing of appeasement among the West Ger-
lnans for example. The avowed purpose of 
current West German efforts at detente are 
directed toward the easing of tensions In 
Central Europe. It is equally difficult to ac-
cept that a reduction of even half of the 
current U.S. force levels In Europe would cr~­
ate In European minds such and attitude of 
demoralization that they would turn from 
detente to appeasement. This reasoning Ig-
nores the French withdrawal from NATO 
and subsequent efforts at detente with Rus-
s_la that did not produce an appeasement 
attitude. It also falls to give full considera-
tion to the weight of the continued Ameri-
can presence and nuclear guarantees that 
~>till would exist after a troop reduction. 
·! nalysis of Gem Argument 5 that unilateral 
force reductions would weaken the u.s. 
negotiating position with the Soviets for 
mutual balanced troop reductions 
For years Western statesmen have defined 
1· e Soviet goals In Central Europe as a 
continuation o! ,a divided Germany, a re-
moval of all American troops from Europe 
and the dismemberment of NATO. Assum-
1~ that this de!1nltlon 1s accurate, It would 
seem that U.S. force levels would not be a 
decisive factor In negotiating mutual troop 
reductions. Soviet overall goals would ap-
pear to dictate that It would be equally as 
Important to remove a remaining 100,000-
plus U.S. troops as to remove 300,000 troops. 
Any level of U.S. force maintained In Central 
Europe would be a bargaining agent toward 
mutual reductions. 
No one has suggested that these mutual 
reductions must be on a man-for-man or 
dlvlslon-for-dlvlslon basts. Obviously, such 
reductions would favor the Soviets who have 
a preponderant strength to begin with. Any 
mutual reductions would have to be worked 
out on a relative basts and this could be 
arranged as well with 160,000 U.S. troops as 
with 300,000 troops. The key to the Issue Is 
the Warsaw Pact slncerHy In desiring mutual 
reductions. To date, they have Insisted that 
any discussions concerning mutual balanced 
force reductions must be within the frame-
work of a European security conference-
something our Secretary of State and the 
NATO foreign ministers oppose In principle. 
It Is unlikely that such an Impasse of opinion 
between East and West Is going to be re-
solved In the foreseeable future an"d this In 
fact Implies that the U.S. must continue 
present force levels for an Indefinite period 
until the question of a European security 
conference can be settled. Such a position Is 
tantamount to saying that U.S. force levels 
In Europe wlll remain the same for an Inde-
terminate number of years-possibly another 
de<:ade. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk speaking tn 
relation -to the U.S. troop reductions In 
Europe In 1967 stated that he favored those 
reductions "not only because they were steps 
of economy, but also because they con-
stituted a tension-lessening signal to the So-
viet Union." The withdrawals that Secretary 
Rusk referred to represented a reduction of 
U.S. forces below their pre-1961 Berlin Crisis 
strength, and came at a time when world 
tensions were steadily Increasing as the war 
In Vietnam escalated In Intensity. Yet these 
reductions did not produce any collapse of 
European morale, nor did they set In motion 
any chain of causation that caused the So-
viets to exploit our position In Berlin that 
was weakened by the heavy demands of the 
VIetnam buildup .. The further thinning out 
of our manpower and equipment from our 
European based troops for use In Vietnam 
1968 and 1969 did not result In any Soviet 
moves to take advantage of our weakened 
forces. In fact, It was during this period that 
continued Soviet troop transfers from Europe 
to the Siberian front with China occurred. 
No public evidence available to date Indi-
cates that our force levels In Europe neces-
sarily play a decisive role In the possibility 
of gaining mutual balanced force reductions. 
On this question It appears that the Intent 
and purposes of both the NATO and Warsaw 
Pact alliances Is far more Important to a suc-
cessful outcome than the tactical question 
of the precise number of troops Involved. 
Analysts of Con Argument 6, which stresses 
that the actual dollar savings involved tn 
a substantial U.S. troop reduction would 
be insignificant in relation to the grave 
r-isk to our national security 
The fiscal yee.r cost of maintaining U.S. 
forces In Europe and those In the U.S. com-
mitted to Europe, is put at $14 bllllon. U.S. 
annual balance-of-payment costs In NATO 
countries are estlmlllted at $1.7 bUllon. At 
present offset agreements with West Ger-
many balance out only some of these costs. 
If U.S. force levels were cut In half, It would 
be possible to realize savings In the range 
of $500 mllllon or more under current con-
ditions. These savings could eventually be 
substantially much more than that amount, 
If we take Into acoount the future Increased 
pay scales envisioned for our armed forces 
and the growl~ Inflation In Europe. 
Opponents to troop cuts e;ite the fact 
that unleoo the troops brought back are 
demoblllzed they stlll must be paid the. 
same amounts. The dlvlslr'lS returned could 
be deactivated. But even If they are not, 
the money they spend would go Into the 
pockets of American rather than European 
businessmen. It would thus directly return 
to the American economy. Another argument 
put forward Is that 1f U.S. force levels were 
cut, West Germany would no longer pay off-
set costs on the same magnitude as today. 
Of course the balance-of-payment costs 
would not continue on the magnitude that 
the are today either, If two Aivlslons (with 
all their sustaining elements) were ret urned 
from Europe. 
Since there Is no clear argument on how 
the removal of two U.S. divisions from West-
ern Europe presents a grave threat to U.S. 
n.a.t lonal se<:urlty, It Is difficult to equate ac-
curately this statement to the very rea! 
possibility of effecting annual savings In U.S. 
balance-of-payment costs In excess of $500 
million. 
Analysis of Con Argument 7, that force levels 
must remain the same because forces hast-
ily returned during a crisis arc not as effec-
tive as those pet·manently stationed in 
Europe 
This argument bas llttle hlstorl<;al ml!l-
tary substance In relation to the U.S. armed 
forces. In two world wars U.S. forces have tra-
ditionally fought well In Europe over battle 
terrain they had never seen before. Besides. 
battlefields change from day-to-day as do the 
personnel '1ghtlng the battle. Therefore fam-
Iliarity with Initial battle terrain has little 
actual effect a'fter the first day or two of 
combat. I! they are well trained, newly ar-
rived forces would be every bit as effective as 
those permanently stationed In Europe. 
In a letter of April 27, 1970, to the Chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Committee, the 
Secretary of State In commenting on Senate 
Resolution 292, stated, "Additional redeploy-
ments would bring such disadvantages as the 
loss of constant liaison with forces on our 
flanks, danger of massive confusion In a crisis 
situation and Increased risks to our forces as 
they moved forward Into position. Moreover. 
any division we redeployed to the US. could 
only be returned to Europe quickly If we 
preposition Its equipment and rely on air-
lift 'for return of the forces . Since we already 
preposition equipment for some of our U.S. 
based divisions, any additional reliance on re-
deployment with preposltlonlng would strain 
not only our transport capablllty but also 
reception !acllltles In Europe." 
Most of these reasons are straw men. Due 
to the high personnel turnover In Europe tbe 
Infantry combat units that I commanded 
there seldom were half the men In them 
who were even faintly fll.m1llar wtth the ter-
rain over which our er11.ergency mission called 
for us to fight. Liaison with forces on the 
flanks of the U.S. forces In Europe Is the re-
sponsibility of headquarters higher than di-
vision level. The Army has bad twenty years 
to plan for the forward movement of U.S. 
forces In Western Europe In time o f crisis. 
If there exists today a real posslblllty of 
"massive confusion" and "Increased risks to 
our forces" then two decades of Army Com-
manders and staff planners have failed to do 
their job. If such a situation truly exis ts then 
all U.S. divisions should probably be with-
drawn from West Germany. They can't hope 
to fight and stay there IT they cannot be 
efficiently reinforced In the forward battle 
areas. 
The problem of preposlttonlng dtv.slon 
equipment and the subsequent requirement 
for a second costly set In the U.S. Is an old 
dodge. There are many ways this seemingly 
lnsurmouhtable problem could be overcome. 
And none would be as costly In balance of 
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payments as keeping the divisions In Europe. 
One Is to dual-base our statesl&e diVisions 
that are committed to Europe, with U.S. Na-
tional Guard or R-eserve divisions and have 
each or these divisions use the same set o! 
heavy division equipment In the U.S. 
It the division returned to Europe this 
heavy equipment could be left In the U.S. for 
use by the Guard or Reserve division when It 
was mobilized. Or, some of It could: be alr-
ll.!ted with the division to Europe. Kt present 
enough equipment tor approximately two 
divisions Is preposltloned In Europe. The 
equipment tor two more divisions could be 
maintained afloat In East Coast ports and 
could arrive In Europe within 9 to 15 days. 
The U.S. airlift capacity would require at 
least that long to transport 4 divisions to Eu-
. rope. In any event It Is not feasible to be-
lieve that ln time of crisis In Europe, the 
nation that can put men on the moon can-
not expeditiously move two divisions and 
their equipment to Europe In less than two 
weeks. 
It also makes little sense to me to con-
tinue to maintain the excessive logistics 
"tall" In position to service additional divi-
sions that will theoretically be flown to Eu-
rope during a crisis, If those divisions face 
the danger of "massive confusion" and "In-
creased risks" during forward movement to 
battle. Yet despite these evident dangers and 
risks, the Joint Chiefs and the SHAPE Com-
mander advocate wltbdrawing the combat 
diVisions rather than the logistics support 
forces. Their concem points up the !act that 
under today's Army tactical organization 
• there must be a huge logistics base befOTe the 
U.S. Army can commence to fight. This Is an 
organizational concept which must be 
changed I! the Army Is going to ever again 
fight austerely and etrectlvely anywhere In 
the world. 
Analysis of Con Argument 8, concerning the 
transitional nature oj the early 1970' s in 
Europe and the contention that troop cu.ts 
would inject a destabilizing factor 
Europe has been in transition at least 
since 1870 and wlll no doubt continue so for 
many years to come. There have been num-
erous dlstabUizlng factors Injected Into the 
NATO scene over the past ten years. The 
rejection o! British entry into the Common 
Market and French withdrawal from NATO, 
could be cited as two more recent examples. 
Yet none of these serious factors have pro-
duced a collapse o! the alliance on the scale 
that Is being so direly predicted 1f the U.S. 
withdraws two Army divisions and their 
sustaining troops from Europe. 
To accept the transitional argument Is to 
accept that It will be necessary to continue 
Indefinitely to provide a level of conven-
tional defense !or our NATO all!es that they 
have clearly demonstrated they are unwill-
Ing to provide !or themselves. This conven-
ilonal defense Is o! qucst.Ionable value and 
comes at excessive cost to the citizens ot the 
United States. The United States Is also In 
a period o! transition. And this translstlonal 
period In our country demands that we re-
duce our overseas balance or payments In 
order that these millions may be available 
to assist us through our period of changing 
priorities. As an American the well-being 
of our country seems to me a far more over-
riding argument than a theoretical risk to 
our national security postulated by Euro-
peans who do not want to divert their money 
and manpower to defend themselves. These 
Europeans are supported by our own State 
and Defense people who !or many bureau-
cratic reasons desire to maintain the Cold 
War status quo In Europe Indefinitely. 
It Is true that the prosperity or the U.S. 
and western Europe hlis advanced markedly 
during the past years of NATO. But the time 
has now come when economic good sense 
dictates that U.S. defense forces In Europe 
must be reduced in our own best Interest. 
To further delay these reductions In the 
hope of achieving what the Secretary o! 
State has called on "optimum future re-
lationship" Is to overlook our past elforts 
of twenty years while risking the sacrifice 
of our own national future In the bargain. 
GENERAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION 
Despite arguments to the contrary, U.S. 
troop levela In Europe should be reduced 
by the equivalent o! two divisions and their 
su.sta.inlng troops (roughly 100,000 men). 
Additionally, at least another 50,000 men 
should be withdrawn from the layers of U.S. 
Command headquarters (such as EUCOM, 
USAREUR, USAFE and USNAVEUR) and 
non-USEUCOM forces such as the Mili-
tary Assistance Groups. The number o! tac-
tical nuclear weapons stored in Europe should 
be reduc-ed. Pa.rtlcular atten tlon should be 
given to the political and military con-
sequencea of the possible emplacement and 
use · of Atomic Demolition Mines (ADM) 
during an emergency. U.S. Southern Euro-
pean Task Force (SETAF) in Verona, Italy, 
and Its supporting logistics complex at Camp 
Darby, IJvorno, Italy, should be withdrawn. 
If needed, the limited r&nge nuclear fire 
support that th.1.s 'IIask Force now provides 
to th-e Italla.n army could be teturned in time 
of emergency. The Berlin Brigade should be 
reduced by one Infantry battalion. Under 
EUCOM war planning these forces are 'writ-
ten olf in time of war. They are only sym-
bolic and two battalions can do this as well 
as three. The loth Special Forces and Fifth 
Psychological Operation Battalion should 
also be withdrawn.) 
War plans of the U.S. 7th Army should 
be reviewed to establish whether or not this 
force does have a slgnlftca.nt capacity to pro-
vide a flexible respom;e to Soviet attack, 
without early use of SOille form of tactical 
nuclear weapons. For example, In 1962 the 
7th Army considered It necessary to make 
early use of ADM'a and low-yield (2.5-10 
KT) nuclear weapons In making a defense 
of Europe east of the Rhine River. This was 
at a time when there were I!IPProxlmately 
400,000 troops lnclu~ 5 dlvlalons 1n Eu-
rope, and the available NATO theater of 
operations and supply llnes extended back 
acro.ss the width and depth of France. 
Since that time the force has been re-
duced to 300,000 troops including 4¥., divi-
sions. The possible theater of operations has 
been reduced to the narrow width of West 
Germany and tbe Benelux countries and the 
British Army of ihe-Rhine has been reduced. 
U.S. supply llne 1n peacettme runs down 
from Bremerhaven, Germany, and in WI\ • • 
time must be shifted !rom the vulnerable 
route to the Bene!= Channel ports, which 
still are only a day O£ so travel away from 
Russian armor in East Germany. To com-
pensate !or the loss o! the depots In France, 
huge stocks (60 days level) of supplies have 
been moved forward to Kalserslautern, Ger-
many, where they are extremely vulner-
able to destruction !rom a Soviet pre-emptive 
air strike or early capture by advancing 
Soviet armor. Our European allies who plan 
on 90 day mob111zatlon periods stockpile !or 
30 day levels while we plan on rushing 
troops to Europe In 30 days. Equally vul-
nerable to pre-emptive air strike or capture 
by Soviet armor are the U.S. 17th Air Force 
fighter squadrons clustered In unprotected 
sites In the Bltburg-Rurnsteln-Spangdohlem-
Prum complex In West Germany. Further-
more, In case o! sudden attack, there are 
the unsolved problems o! how to evacuate 
the 227,000 military dependents. And the 
as ye~ unanswered problem of how we will 
land the airborne redeveloped forces flown 
In during a crisis, 1f the Soviets knock out 
the available air landing sites by air or rocket 
fire, capture them by ground attack or domi-
nate the air over them. 
AU o! these ser!oU!I military problems have 
long existed In our European defense plan-
ning. Since they could not be solved they 
have often been Ignored or glossed-over. Yet 
In 1962 when conditions and options were 
far more favorable for flexible response t han 
today, It was felt that an early use of tactical 
nuclear weapons wOUld be vital to any suc-
cessful defense. Now with less options, the 
same •military problems, r 1us other even more 
grave, with less troops, and a smaller theater 
of operations In which to swap space for 
time, the American public Is being told that 
our conventional forces will put up an even 
longer conventional defense without resort-
ing to tactical nuclear weapons. This Is the 
rhetoric used to justify keeping our military 
and State Department empire In position in 
Europe. But It Is not a factual a.sseo,sment of 
the probable situation. 
In the event of sudden Soviet attack, the 
U.S. 7th Army mu.st" resort to early ,~!thin 
the first 24 to 90 hours of comrnenc:lng battle 
to meet a sudden attack) first use or tactical 
nuclear weapons I! it hopes to prevent being 
outflanked and pocketed against the Alps and 
ann1111la ted. 
In my opinion one U.S. Army Corps con-
taining an armored and mechanized In-
fantry division reinforced with one armored 
cavalry regiment positioned along the line 
Bremen-Hannover-Kassel and supported by 
supply lines running back to Rotterdam or 
Antwerp, would provide a much more realis-
tic U.S. contribution to NATO than our 
present one. Under this eonoept the present 
prepositloned equipment far one armored 
and one mechanized division could remain, 
as could the tanks o! the armored division 
'being withdrawn. This equipment would 
provide the basis !or an early reinforcement 
o! 2 armored and one mechanized division if 
this were later required. Support forces left 
In Europe should be those required to aust-
erely support the two division force, main-
tain a drastically reduced number of stored 
tactical nuclear weapons and maintain the 
preposltloned equipment. Air squadrons In 
West Germany should be those required to 
tactically support the Corps force and ac-
complish forward strategic missions. The 3rd 
Air Force In England should command all 
air elements In Europe. Navy elements 
should be commanded from afloat command 
ships under the Atlantic Commander. Only 
the Corps, division and one logistics com-
m!Uld headquarters should be left In Europe. 
The corps should command all group forces 
In Europe and be commanded by the Secre-
tary o! Defense exercising direction through 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Depart -
ments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
Length o! tours of military personnel as-
signed in Europe should be optional. For ex-
ample, the mU!tary member should have a 
choice of serving in Europe 15 months with-
out his family or 48 months wltb his family. 
Above all we must stop deluding our-
selves that we can financially afford to 
posture a truly effective conventional war 
deterrent to the Soviet Army In Central 
Europe. This force Is a representative one 
at best and 4¥., divisions are actually no 
more sufficient for the mission than 2 divi-
sions. There Is no valid reason to continue 
to accept our adverse European balance-of-
payments costs In pursuit o! the butter-
fly of conventional war capability In Cen-
tral Europe. Russia could as soon defend 
Mexico from a U.S. conventional attack. The 
answer to Soviet attack In Western Europe 
111lll of necessity be nuclear regardless of 
whether we have 4 Y3 divisions or 2 divisions 
stationed there. But with 2 dlvis!ons and a 
smaller overall force we have more options 
before having to resort to nuclear war to de-
fend a large number of U.S. soldiers. True 
flexible respnnse In Euroj~e calls !or either a 
greatly Increased number of U.S. divisions 
there, or a smaller number that could be 
risked I! ..national necessity so dictated. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum. 
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